We examine the impact of distressed acquisitions on acquirer volatility and default risk for a worldwide sample of distressed firms using several risk measures. We find that, on average, absolute levels of historical and implied volatility do not change following a distressed acquisition. However, distressed acquisitions generate a significant increase in relative total, systematic and idiosyncratic volatility and default risk, hence risk rises for both shareholders and bondholders. In particular, we show that high market-to-book acquirers, frequent acquirers, low-risk acquirers, higher acquisition premia and deals closed during bull markets are associated with higher levels of post-acquisition risk. Interestingly, high-risk acquirers experience a significant reduction in volatility and default risk.
INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the world entered a global financial crisis, resulting in a massive number of bankruptcies, fire sales and forced acquisitions. Organisations that came under severe financial pressure struggled with restructurings and workouts, sometimes ending up in bankruptcy.
Acquisitions of these troubled firms might in many cases offer a more preferable exit path to many of the stakeholders involved (Jensen, 1991; Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1988; Balcaen et al., 2009) . This paper studies the risk effects of acquiring such distressed firms.
To date, research on distressed acquisitions is scant and has mainly focussed on performance. Previous research tends to agree that distressed acquisitions lead to positive abnormal stock returns for acquirers, yet results for operating performance are mixed (Clark and Ofek, 1994; Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1998; Carapeto et al., 2009) . However, to evaluate the success of an acquisition, the impact on risk should be considered as well. Even though the credit crisis has triggered an increasing risk awareness, existing research on risk effects in corporate M&A transactions remains overall scarce. Moreover, research on the risk impact of distressed acquisitions is non-existent.
Most of the earlier studies seem to indicate that, on average, acquirer risk increases following acquisitions. However, rather few investigated the determinants that explain why acquirer risk changes. In prior research, risk reduction is among the reasons commonly cited for mergers. Amihud and Lev (1981) show that conglomerate mergers have a risk-reducing diversification effect on the combined entity. However, more recent studies find that acquirer default risk rises due to changes in financial leverage (Ghosh and Jain, 2000; Morellec and Zhdanov, 2008) . Furfine and Rosen (2011) add to this discussion that M&A increases default risk driven by aggressive managerial actions impacting risk enough to outweigh the diversification effect.
Hence, it is important to deepen our understanding of why an acquisition may change acquirer risk. Particularly, distressed M&A represents a unique environment to further study risk in M&A transactions as acquirers are exposed to a number of additional risks. Distressed acquisitions may create attractive opportunities to expand geographically or activity-wise, to increase market share and generate new revenues at discounted prices. Simultaneously, these transactions may contain more risk as they often take place in shorter timeframes and involve more complex valuations increasing the risk of overpayment. Moreover, managers may underestimate the efforts required to turn around and integrate the distressed firm. Consequently, the ability to assess and manage these risks will determine the risk exposure and eventually the return to shareholders.
Our study contributes to the existing M&A literature in several important ways. First, this paper is the first to study the risk impact and drivers of distressed acquisitions. Second, we use various risk measures to identify potential risk effects as prior studies in the risk literature have reached little consensus in terms of the most appropriate risk measure. By comparing several measures, we try to capture different dimensions of risk and avoid biased results due to methodological issues. Third, we analyse a worldwide data sample of distressed acquisitions over a long time period -acquisitions occurring between 1990 and 2009 -while related literature typically uses relatively small samples and is predominantly US oriented.
Our results point to a significant risk increase for both shareholders and bondholders. In particular, we show that distressed acquisitions have, on average, no impact on absolute levels of bidder historical and implied volatility. However, relative total, systematic and idiosyncratic volatility and default risk rise significantly. Interestingly, volatility and default risk increase for low-risk acquirers, whereas volatility and default risk reduce for high-risk acquirers. This suggests that risk changes cannot solely be explained by a risk transfer from distressed target to acquirer. Especially for high-risk acquirers the asset diversification effect is large enough to outweigh the risk increase generated by the acquisition itself in contrast to transactions involving low-risk acquirers.
We further investigate the influence of diversification, acquirer management quality and expertise, market conditions, bidder overpayment and acquirer pre-acquisition risk. High market-tobook acquirers, frequent acquirers, low-risk acquirers, deals involving higher acquisition premia and deals closed during bull markets are associated with higher levels of post-acquisition risk.
Additionally, downside risk increases for acquirers with good recent stock performance. Moreover, the risk increase for low-risk acquirers is mainly driven by closing larger distressed deals and taking up higher levels of leverage. These results may point to management hubris in distressed acquisitions, yet we find some evidence inconsistent with this hypothesis. Overpayment is lower for transactions involving high market-to-book acquirers even though they have more financial flexibility. In addition, high-risk acquirers seem to be reluctant towards additional leverage by preferring stock-financed deals involving less leveraged targets. Hence, our results indicate that bidder pre-acquisition performance and risk and market conditions impact the type of acquisitions and consequently the risk effects in distressed transactions. This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review related literature, and develop our hypotheses. Section 2 describes our sample and explains the methodology. Section 3 presents the results, while the last section summarizes and concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOThESIS DEVELOPMENT
Earlier research on distressed M&A mainly concentrates on performance effects. Clark and Ofek (1994) analyse a sample of 38 US distressed takeovers using several performance measures and find that acquirers have negative post-merger performance. Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) analyse a sample of 55 US acquisitions and show that acquirers significantly gain in operating performance and earn positive abnormal returns following the acquisition of a target in Chapter 11.
In a recent paper, Carapeto et al. (2009) report that acquirers have positive abnormal announcement returns when taking over a distressed or bankrupt target. Moreover, the combined long-term performance improves compared to the combined pre-bid performance but deteriorates compared to the acquirer pre-acquisition performance. In sum, prior studies show that distressed acquisitions generate positive abnormal stock returns for acquirers while results on operating performance are mixed. Our study extends previous distressed M&A research by investigating the dynamics that may affect acquirer risk. Due to the lack of research in this area, we proceed by reviewing risk in non-distressed M&A literature.
While some studies have examined the risk impact of acquisitions, only few have investigated the determinants of risk changes. In addition, prior research opts for different methodological choices. One of the first and most commonly used methods to study risk around corporate acquisitions is by calculating volatility of stock returns. Correspondingly, Langetieg et al.
(1980) collect a sample of 82 US mergers and report that total, systematic and idiosyncratic risk increase due to mergers. Lubatkin and O'Neill (1987) show that mergers are associated with increases in idiosyncratic risk for a sample of 297 US large mergers. Further, they find a significant decline in systematic and total risk for related mergers. More recently, Amihud et al. (2002) and Mishra et al. (2005) use this method to evaluate the impact of bank mergers on risk. Amihud et al. (2002) find overall no significant effect on acquirer risk in the post-merger period for a sample of 214 cross-border bank mergers. Mishra et al. (2005) show that for non-conglomerate bank mergers, total and idiosyncratic risk significantly decline in a sample of 14 US acquiring banks, whereas no significant change was reported in systematic risk.
In two former studies, Bharath and Wu (2005) and Geppert and Kamerschen (2008) investigate effects of corporate US mergers on acquirer risk, by calculating implied volatilities of options. Bharath and Wu (2005) find that there is a strong run-up in total, systematic, and idiosyncratic implied volatility in four years before the merger and one year after the merger announcement. This pre-merger run-up is explained by the hypothesis that M&As are a response to industry shocks. In addition, Geppert and Kamerschen (2008) use a sample of 25 corporate mergers and find that at least for the first 18 months after the merger completion date, mergers do not reduce risk in the same way that a portfolio of the two individual firms would, suggesting that mergers increase expected risk for shareholders.
More recent work estimates risk changes via default risk measures. As the optimal risk measure is still under discussion in the failure prediction literature, there is a growing number of studies that develop new enhanced measures based on Merton's model (1974) , such as implied probability of default in CDS spreads or bond yields (Bharath and Shumway, 2008) , option implied probability of default (Capuano, 2008) , Expected Default Frequency (EDF) using Moody's KMV, etc.
The only study in this area that uses EDF in corporate M&A research is Furfine and Rosen (2011) who show that acquirer default risk increases following mergers, mainly due to managerial actions outweighing the risk-reducing effect of asset diversification. In particular, mergers increase risk when CEOs have large option-based compensation, recent stock performance is poor, and idiosyncratic equity volatility is high. Moreover, Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) are the first to study risk implications of bank M&A by using Merton's distance to default model. They show that M&A has on average no impact on acquirer risk. However, low-risk banks experience a significant increase in default risk, particularly for cross-border and conglomerate deals and M&A completed under weak regulation, indicating that acquirer pre-merger risk is an important determinant of acquisition-related risk effects. In sum, most of the earlier studies find that, on average, acquirer risk increases following acquisitions. However, a complete understanding of what is driving these risk changes is still lacking.
Based on the literature review, we identify the following factors that may impact risk in distressed acquisitions: activity and geographic diversification, management quality and expertise, bidder pre-acquisition risk, overpayment and market conditions.
Activity and geographic diversification
In general, risk diversification is amongst one of the most frequently suggested motives for bank and corporate M&As. Craig and dos Santos (1997) claim that acquirers select bank targets that allow for a substantial decline in acquirer risk, through geographic and activity diversification. effect on the combined entity. Due to non-perfectly correlated cash flows, Lewellen (1971) points to a coinsurance effect. Mergers reduce risk, which results in a lower cost of external financing, more debt capacity and a larger tax shield. The motive of risk reduction through diversification appears not to be beneficial to shareholders since they can achieve the risk reduction on their own by diversifying their portfolio (Amihud and Lev, 1981) . Further, they argue that managers look for conglomerate mergers to decrease their personal risk. Managers with more personal wealth tied up in a firm, try to diversify by engaging in diversifying M&As (May, 1995) .
Apart from a risk-reducing effect, conglomerate mergers may be risk-increasing due to limited knowledge of the industry environment as opposed to related acquisitions. Hence, Clark and Ofek (1994) report that acquirers of distressed targets are often in the same industry. Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) find that bidders for bankrupt firms frequently have some prior relationship with the target and are, as a result, well aware of the value and best use of the target's assets. Moreover, related mergers are more synergistic, leading to reduced costs given the economies of scale and scope (Chatterjee and Lutbatkin, 1990) . Therefore, we expect conglomerate distressed transactions to increase acquirer risk.
Risk diversification could also be achieved via foreign expansion and is often a dominant reason for cross-border M&A. As two geographically different markets are imperfectly correlated, earnings volatility may be reduced (Seth, 1990) . Fatemi (1984) studied the effect of corporate international diversification and find that shareholders' total risk and systematic risk declines. In addition, internationalisation may increase the likelihood of realizing synergies. We expect that foreign expansion via distressed acquisitions reduces risk given the fast access to new markets, new resources and technology. We include in our multivariate analysis a conglomerate and a crossborder dummy.
Management quality and expertise
Apart from synergetic effects, M&A may be motivated by agency problems and hubris destroying shareholder value. Management hubris may lead to poor acquisition decisions in case management overestimates its own abilities when determining the potential synergetic effects (Roll, 1986; Rau and Vermaulen, 1997) . Consequently, hubris might cause managers to underestimate the cost and effort of the turnaround. Hubris is mainly related to firms that have experienced good performance. In contrast to Roll's hubris hypothesis, Morck et al. (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that poor prior performance incentivizes managers to perform risk-increasing transactions. Low-performing acquirers may have lower quality managers that pursue their personal objectives and therefore likely make bad acquisitions (Masulis et al., 2007) . However, we expect that high-performing acquirers take more risk given the higher level of financial flexibility. We measure acquirer prior performance via the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return and the marketto-book ratio.
Further, we explore whether prior acquisition experience may be related to changes in risk.
In M&A and performance literature, the effect of prior experience on the performance of subsequent acquisitions is mixed (Haleblian et al., 2009 ). Prior experience is found to be positively correlated with acquisition performance. However, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) report that the relationship between acquisition experience and acquisition performance is not positively linear.
Moreover, frequent acquisitions may result in higher integration risk because frequent acquirers may not have sufficient time to integrate the targets (Kusewitt, 1985; Bharath and Wu, 2005) . In addition, distressed acquisitions may involve more complex valuations than non-distressed M&A.
Consequently, applying non-distressed M&A experience to distressed transactions has its limitations.
Moreover, we could expect that prior successful acquisitions strengthens management confidence which makes them vulnerable for management hubris. Hence, we hypothesize that risk rises when acquirers have more experience in non-distressed M&A deals. We measure acquisition experience by the number of non-distressed M&A transactions prior to the current deal.
Bidder pre-acquisition risk
A firm's risk profile and attitude towards risk may influence its acquisition decisions.
Moreover, the strategic needs of an acquirer could be different depending on the initial risk profile.
In banking literature, Brewer (1989) reports that only high-risk banks gain from diversification, while Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) show that only low-risk banks increase default risk. In addition, Bruton et al. (1994) argue that high-risk acquirers may acquire firms to exit a difficult environment, to improve resources and their competitive position. Hence, distressed targets create attractive opportunities as the upside restructuring potential is high. Moreover, Furfine and Rosen (2011) suggest that 'mergers are used as a mechanism to achieve a desired level of default risk'.
Consequently, we expect that low-risk acquirers will take more risk than high-risk acquirers. We test for bidder pre-acquisition risk by including a dummy variable for low-risk and high-risk acquirers in our regression model.
Acquisition premium
According to Clark and Ofek (1994) , the size of the premium is negatively correlated with the success of the restructuring, mainly due to overpayment. Acquirers may pay higher acquisition premia if more synergistic gains are expected from the transaction. However, overpayment might occur when these synergies cannot be realized. In addition, management hubris may lead to higher acquisition premia as management may be overoptimistic. Hence, we expect that higher premia result in higher acquisition risk. The acquisition premium is measured by the ratio of takeover price minus target's stock price to target's stock price. Bouwman et al. (2009) suggest that acquisitions in bull markets are of poorer quality. During bear markets, management is expected to be highly risk averse due to market uncertainty.
Bull and bear markets
Consequently, management exercises special caution in planning, implementing and controlling the acquisition processes which increases the likelihood that a firm closes a successful M&A transaction (Lutbatkin and O'Neill, 1987) . Opposite behaviour should occur during bull markets. We hypothesize that distressed acquisitions are more risk-increasing during bull markets, measured by the yearly change in MSCI stock return index.
Control variables
First, we control for the changes in leverage surrounding the transaction measured by the change in acquirer total liabilities on total assets. We expect that increased leverage results in more financial risk. According to Ghosh and Jain (2000) firms increase financial leverage following mergers caused by more debt capacity. In addition, transactions financed with debt increase a firm's leverage ratio. Moreover, acquiring a distressed target without a prior debt restructuring, may lead to an upturn in bidder's post-acquisition leverage. Further, we control for the degree of target risk in several ways by including respectively the target interest coverage ratio and target distance-todefault in our regression model. We further test whether our results are not driven by high-tech targets by including a high-tech dummy variable.
Next, we introduce the method of payment via a stock dummy variable. Hansen (1987) argues that an acquirer should pay in stock when an acquirer has less information on the target's value. Given the potential information asymmetry between acquirer and distressed target, we expect that stock-financed deals will be less risk increasing than cash-financed acquisitions. In addition, we evaluate the expected return of the deal, measured by the cumulative abnormal return around the event window. If shareholders expect the deal to be risk increasing without positive returns, the effect on acquirer stock price should be negative. Following Furfine and Rosen (2011), we predict a negative correlation between abnormal cumulative returns and changes in risk.
Further, we test for the target status via a public dummy variable. We expect that the acquisition of a public distressed target is less likely to increase risk given the higher disclosure requirements for public firms which reduce information asymmetry. We also control for the relative size of the target to the acquirer. Larger targets are likely to be more risk diversifying than small targets (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011) . Opposed to diversification benefits, acquisitions of large targets will make integration more complex than relativity small targets. In addition, larger targets may be more difficult to restructure than smaller targets (Clark and Ofek, 1994) . We expect that acquisitions of large targets result in a risk increase. In addition, we control for acquirer size itself measured by the log of market value of assets. We expect that larger acquirers are less affected by distressed acquisitions as large acquirers have less business risk.
To control for market liquidity, we add the corporate spread measured by the spread on AAA versus BAA corporate bonds. We expect that acquirers that close deals during periods when credit is easily available take more risk than when credit is scarce. In addition, we include regional dummies to control for acquirer and target country bias. We also test for differences in institutional factors between countries, which might have an impact on acquirer risk-taking. Therefore, we add the degree of shareholder and creditor protection in a country respectively measured by the antidirector rights index and the creditor rights index (La Porta et al., 1998) . Finally, to control for acquirer industry-specific risk factors, we include industry dummies. . Our initial dataset meets the following criteria: (1) the acquiring firm is a publicly quoted company, (2) the acquirer has a pre-acquisition stake of less than 50% and a final stake of more than 50% in the target company, (3) the sample excludes targets and acquirers from the financial industry 2 , and (4) deals with all sizes of transaction value are included.
Next, we determine whether a target is healthy or distressed. A vast number of 'corporate distress' definitions exists in business failure and bankruptcy prediction literature. In earlier studies (Beaver, 1967; Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980) , corporate distress is defined in terms of default, insolvency or bankruptcy. In reality, a failure process evolves from early stages of distress towards insolvency: a company can be distressed without going into default. A company entering distress may be characterized by negative cumulative earnings, a debt overhang and/or a cash shortage, resulting in insufficient cash flow to cover current financial obligations. Therefore, more recent studies use distress measures such as recurring profit after taxes (Balcaen et al., 2009) , interest coverage ratio (Asquith et al., 1994; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Pindado and Rodrigues, 2005;  Carapeto, 2009), negative cumulative earnings (Gilbert et al., 1990) , leverage ratios (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998), operating margin (Theodossiou et al., 1996) . This yields a sample of 1082 distressed M&A deals.
4 Table   2 summarizes the construction of our sample.
Insert Table 3 -5.
Insert Table 3 -5 About Here Table 3 shows an overrepresentation of US firms, consistent with the geographical distribution of overall M&A activity. 47.60% of the distressed transactions involve a US acquirer, while 44.09% involve a US target. Table 4 presents the industry breakdown for both acquirer and target. Around 40% of the deals are in the manufacturing and services industries. Table 5 summarizes various profitability, liquidity and solvency ratios for acquirer and target in the distressed sample. Not surprisingly, the mean and median of the target profitability ratios are negative, indicating that most of the targets are in economic distress. Some distressed targets are highly leveraged, while others have low leverage. Some acquirers are distressed themselves which explains why the profitability ratios are on average negative. Considering median values, acquirers of distressed targets are profitable, solvent and liquid.
Methodology
To ensure that our results are not driven by the selected risk measure, we use several volatility measures and Merton's default risk measure.
Historical volatility: measuring risk via volatility of stock returns
We follow the standard market model methodology (Chatterjee and Lubatkin, 1990; Lubatkin and O'Neill, 1987; Langetieg et al., 1980) estimate.
An alternative way to look at risk, is by considering only the downside risk. According to Markowitz (1959) the semi-variance is a more acceptable measure of risk. We compute three downside risk measures: the semi-standard deviation below the mean, the semi-standard deviation below zero and the downside beta. Downside beta is the sensitivity of the return on a firm's stock with respect to the MSCI All Countries market return when both returns simultaneously go down (Estrada, 2007) . We use the same estimation windows as described above. Subsequently, we compute the absolute and relative difference scores.
Implied volatility: measuring risk via implied volatility in options
By studying acquisition-related changes in risk, one can calculate historical volatility (see above) or implied volatility. While historical volatility is computed from realized returns, implied volatility is a forward-looking risk measure reflecting the future volatility of returns over the remaining life of the option. We collect standardized implied option volatilities of 30-day call options from the IVY Database of Optionmetrics. As Optionmetrics contains only implied volatilities for the US listed index and equity options market beginning from 1996, our sample will be limited both in time and in geographical scope. We proceed in a similar way as measuring risk via volatility of stock returns (2.2.1). The total implied volatility (σ i ) can be broken down in systematic and idiosyncratic risk via the market model. The capital asset pricing model implies that:
The total risk absolute difference score is equal to the mean implied volatility of the acquirer after the announcement date minus the mean implied volatility of the acquirer before the announcement date (with respective estimation windows: -280 -30 and +2 +252). Systematic risk is estimated by multiplying beta with the implied market volatility (S&P 500 index options) over a 250 days estimation window. The idiosyncratic risk component is calculated as the square root of the squared total implied volatility minus the squared systematic component. Both absolute and relative difference scores are computed.
Default risk: measuring risk via Merton's distance-to-default model
In Merton's model (1974) default occurs when the market value of assets is lower than the book value of total liabilities at maturity. The distance-to-default ( The following input parameters are aggregated. The market value of equity and book value of total liabilities is collected via Thomson Datastream. Further, we downloaded the yield on the 2Y
German government bond and the 2Y US treasury notes as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate. The time to maturity is set to one year. The values of V A,t and σ A,t can be inferred through an iterative process based on the Black-Scholes-Merton pricing model. We employ as starting values for the asset volatility the historical volatility of equity computed daily on the basis of a 250-day rolling window. The following non-linear equations need to be solved:
The absolute change in acquirer DD equals mean DD after the announcement date minus mean DD before the announcement date for the respective estimation windows +2 days +252 days and -280 days -30 days.
In this section, we first examine whether distressed M&A, on average, significantly impact acquirer risk. Subsequently, we shed light on deal-specific and firm-specific factors that influence acquirer risk via a multivariate regression analysis.
The impact of distressed acquisitions on acquirer risk
Insert Table 6 About Here Table 6 presents the results for the various risk measures broken down in systematic and idiosyncratic risk if applicable. We analyse whether the total risk difference score, the systematic Further, we examine risk changes by looking at the percentage change in risk. Relative risk measures have the advantage of considering acquirer pre-acquisition risk. A given absolute change in risk can be more important for a low-risk acquirer (Furfine and Rosen, 2011). The relative difference score is measured by the absolute difference score divided by pre-acquisition risk. Table 6 reports different results with respect to absolute and relative risk measures. We find strong support for an increase in acquirer relative total, idiosyncratic and systematic volatility. 6 Acquirer total volatility rises on average with 5.52% to 9.53% following an acquisition event, depending on the chosen methodology.
The strong but confounding results for the absolute and relative risk measures underline the importance for further investigation of the risk drivers in distressed M&A transactions. Table 7 ranks the acquirers into quartiles based on their degree of pre-acquisition risk.
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Insert Table 7 About Here
We notice that volatility and default risk decline from low-risk to high-risk acquirers. Hence, we find strong evidence of risk increases for low-risk acquirers and risk reduction for high-risk acquirers independent of the risk measure. 8 Consistent with prior research (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011; Furfine and Rosen, 2011) , these results confirm our expectations that acquirer pre-acquisition risk is an important driver. To test the robustness of our risk measures, we re-run the regression models with different market (country) indices. We also collect and analyse the data both in dollar and local currency when applicable. In addition, we use total financial debt as an input parameter instead of total liabilities for the distance-to-default calculation. We confirm our main findings. However, further tests in a multivariate context are necessary to evaluate the impact of various deal-specific and firm-specific factors on these risk changes.
Determinants of changes in acquirer risk
In this section, we examine the impact of various factors on distressed acquisition-related risk changes. The dependent variables in the regression models are the historical and implied volatility and default risk measures. The choice of the explanatory and control variables is based on the literature review and hypothesis development summarized in table 1. We checked the variance inflation factors and the correlations among the various explanatory and control variables. Apart from the institutional factors and regional dummies being highly correlated, no multicollinearity is found. Subsequently, we dropped the regional dummies from our regressions. However, we found no regional effects when including the regional dummies instead of the institutional factors as control variables. Further, our regressions are run using robust standard errors. Table 8 reports the summary statistics of the independent variables. Due to missing data, the number of observations is smaller than the initial distressed sample of 1082 deals. However, note that the summary statistics of both the historical volatility sample and distance-to-default sample are in line with the summary statistics of the overall distressed sample. 9 The option implied volatility sample is slightly different but this can be explained by the geographical scope being restricted to US due to data availability issues and the fact that firms issuing options are mostly larger firms.
Insert Table 8 About Here
In the full distressed sample, 51.58% involve deals within related industries, measured via 3-digit SIC code 10 and 31.23% are cross-border transactions. In addition, the acquirer market adjusted buy-and-hold return is on average 16.26% over 250 days, while the average acquirer market-to-book ratio is 2.54. Most of the acquirers (67.51%) have prior acquisition experience with an average of 3.5 non-distressed deals prior to the current transaction. The yearly change in the MSCI world index is 5.4%. The premium paid for the target is on average 77.18%. Moreover, the leverage ratio increases post-acquisition with about 0.0123. Not surprisingly, the mean interest coverage ratio is negative.
Further, 23.36% of the distressed targets belongs to a high-tech industry. 31.80% of the deals are fully stock financed, while 44.78% of the deals are fully cash financed. The mean cumulative abnormal return over 5 days is 0.31% with a high standard deviation of 10.51%. 55.17% of the deals involve a public target. The transaction value averages around 30% of the acquirer market value.
Finally, the corporate spread is on average 1.09%.
Insert Table 9a About Here 9 Apart from the cumulative abnormal return which is due to the large standard deviation in both the full distressed sample as the other samples. 10 If we measure industry relatedness via 2-digit SIC code, 60% of the deals are within related industries.
effects in distressed acquisitions amongst the historical and implied volatility measures. Our results point to a decrease in volatility for conglomerate distressed acquisitions, which is inconsistent with our hypothesis. However, these transactions do not reduce acquirer default risk. A possible explanation could be that the risk-reducing diversification effect does not outweigh the increase in leverage given that the distance-to-default measure explicitly takes leverage into account. There are no diversification effects from cross-border distressed acquisitions. Moreover, we find no significant interaction effect between conglomerate and cross-border transactions.
Further, acquirers with recent poor stock performance (low buy-and-hold return)
significantly increase default risk. In contrast, the results for the downside volatility measure indicate that high-performing acquirers increase downside risk more than low-performing acquirers. In addition, we test management quality by acquirer market-to-book ratio. We report that a high market-to-book ratio leads to an increase in volatility and default risk. This confirms our hypothesis that acquirers with more potential resources are able to take on more risk. In addition, high marketto-book companies are associated with growth companies suggesting that these companies have more to gain in distressed acquisitions. However, these companies may also be more exposed to management hubris so that management overestimates its capabilities to successfully restructure the distressed target. Similarly, acquirers with more non-distressed acquisition expertise generate significant increases in volatility and default risk. Subsequently, we check whether an interaction effect exists between acquisition experience and market-to-book. However, no interaction effect is found. As the results of the market-to-book ratio and acquisition experience tend to refer to managerial agency problems, we test Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis (1986) . Following this hypothesis, managers with large free cash flows should take more risk in distressed acquisitions as the upward potential is higher which may encompass more private benefits such as higher remuneration and personal prestige. Hence, we control for acquirer EBITDA on total assets and cash on total assets but we find no significant results. Further, we also evaluate the impact of accounting performance on risk by including acquirer return on assets, but find no significant results. Moreover, we test for acquirer distressed acquisition experience, sector-related experience and non-linear relationships between risk and experience but find no significant results.
Further, we confirm our univariate tests that volatility and default risk reduce for high-risk acquirers. In addition, we find strong support that low-risk acquirers generate increases in downside volatility and default risk. Moreover, we report that transactions in bull markets are more riskincreasing than deals closed in bear markets. This confirms our hypothesis that bidders take more risk during (over-)optimistic markets.
Furthermore, we control for leverage changes and disclose that high levels of leverage significantly increase both volatility and default risk. The effect is not surprising for the distance-todefault measure as we use leverage to calculate this measure. However, also historical and implied volatility rise when leverage increases. We find consistent results if we control for total financial debt on total assets instead of total leverage on total assets. To assess the effect of the target's risk profile on acquirer volatility and default risk, we test for the target's degree of risk via its Interest
Coverage Ratio and Distance-to-Default (not reported), but find no significant results. In addition, no significant results are reported for the target high-tech dummy, the method of payment and the cumulative abnormal return. 11 Moreover, we find some support that transactions involving large acquirers and public targets are less risk-increasing, whereas large deals increase risk. We also consider the impact of market liquidity and reveal that deals closed in markets with credit scarcity are more risk-increasing. Finally, we control for industry effects and institutional factors but find no significant results.
The impact of management quality
The regression results in table 9a confirm a number of hypotheses. However, the conflicting evidence of acquirer pre-acquisition performance measured by buy-and-hold return and market-tobook ratio is somewhat surprising. Acquirers with low buy-and-hold returns are associated with riskincreasing transactions, consistent with Morck et al. (1990) . High market-to-book acquirers tend to take more risk, consistent with the hubris hypothesis of Roll (1986) . Therefore, we further investigate the interaction effect between pre-acquisition risk and pre-acquisition performance. We find that high-risk acquirers are associated with significantly higher buy-and-hold returns than lowrisk acquirers. Not surprisingly, these companies involve more risk and therefore shareholders should be compensated by receiving a higher return. Consequently, we test for an interaction effect between high-risk acquirers and buy-and-hold return. Most of the regression models in table 9b report a significant interaction effect between both. Moreover, the coefficients of the buy-and-hold return variable are no longer significant, except for downside volatility indicating a positive relation consistent with previous findings. This confirms that our initial findings were driven by high buyand-hold returns of high-risk acquirers. We conclude that high market-to-book acquirers increase risk probably driven by a higher availability of resources compared to low market-to-book firms.
However, given that these companies have more funds, they might be vulnerable to management hubris.
11 We also control for the cumulative abnormal return over the period [-30 +2] but find no significant results.
Moreover, acquirers with high buy-and-hold returns increase downside risk indicating that following distressed acquisitions their sensitivity to downside market movements rises. In contrast, high-risk acquirers with high buy-and-hold returns decrease volatility and default risk, suggesting that the market perceives these transactions as less risky.
Insert Table 9b About Here
The impact of overpayment
In this section, we test whether the premium paid for the distressed target has an impact on bidders' volatility and default risk. As the premium is calculated based on the target stock price, this subsample only includes public distressed targets. Table 9c reveals some support for increased implied volatility and default risk due to higher acquisition premia. Higher premia could lead to overpayment. Definitely in distressed acquisitions, overpaying may be higher given that deals are closed in shorter timeframes and involve a more complex analysis. Moreover, management confidence may lead to the payment of higher premia. Given that high market-to-book acquirers have more financial flexibility, we could expect that overpayment is higher in such transactions.
Hence, we test the interaction effect between acquirer market-to-book and the premium paid. Table   9d shows that overpayment is lower for high market-to-book acquirers, which is inconsistent with the hubris hypothesis. In addition, we find the same results when we use the target's cumulative abnormal return around the announcement event as a proxy for acquisition premium.
Insert Table 9c About Here
The impact of bidder pre-acquisition risk
In general, a distressed target has more default risk than the typical acquirer. So, we would expect that, given risk transfer, risk would increase both for acquirers with low and high preacquisition risk. Nevertheless, risk still decreases for high-risk acquirers even if we remove all distressed acquirers (acquirers with an ICR less than one). In addition, we remove all acquirers with a higher degree of default risk than the target's degree of default risk and document that default risk still reduces for high-risk acquirers. This suggests that the changes in risk cannot exclusively be explained by a risk transfer from target to acquirer.
To provide further evidence on risk transfer, we calculate default risk of a hypothetical portfolio of acquirer and target 250 days before acquisition, weighted according to market value of assets of acquirer and target. This limits the distressed sample to 232 observations as we only include public targets for which we can measure Merton's distance-to-default. The average distance-to-default prior to acquisition of this subsample is 4.3694 in line with the full sample average. If we compare default risk of this portfolio to acquirer default risk prior to acquisition, then the average distance-to-default of the portfolio is significantly above the acquirer pre-acquisition value (a difference of 0.7676). This indicates that there is asset diversification. In addition, the postacquisition distance-to-default is significantly below the portfolio's distance-to-default (a difference of -1.4093), again confirming that risk is not solely transferred but may be created by the M&A process itself e.g. uncertainties about expected synergies, integration risk, extra debt capacity, etc.
To control whether the additional evidence is similar for low-and high-risk acquirers, we perform the analysis for both subsamples. For low-risk acquirers we find that although asset diversification is substantial (14%), it is not large enough to outweigh the risk increase generated by the acquisition itself (37%) in contrast to high-risk acquirers. For high-risk acquirers, asset diversification causes a reduction in default risk of 54%, whereas the acquisition itself creates a risk increase of 16%.
Following the above findings, the impact of distressed acquisitions seems to be different for low-risk and high-risk acquirers. Therefore, we examine whether these different risk-effects are linked to diverse acquisition strategies involving different deal and firm characteristics.
First, to get a better understanding of the risk profile of high-and low-risk acquirers, we compare several accounting ratios of the acquirer one year prior to the deal. 12 Table 10a reports that high-risk acquirers are on average smaller than low-risk acquirers, both measured by book size as market value. Moreover, high-risk acquirers score lower on profitability measures than low-risk acquirers. High-risk acquirers have on average a negative ratio of EBITDA to total assets and a negative return on equity. The differences between high-risk and low-risk acquirers are statistically significant at a 1% level. When evaluating the liquidity position, we notice that high-risk acquirers are more liquid than low-risk acquirers. Further, high-risk acquirers are, on average, more leveraged than low-risk acquirers and have a negative interest coverage ratio. Nevertheless, the median value of the interest coverage ratio is positive. In summary, both subsamples have a significantly different risk profile.
Insert Table 10a About Here*** Subsequently, we test whether they acquire targets with different risk profiles as their preacquisition risk profile could play an important role in the selection of the target. Table 10a reports several accounting ratios on target's profitability, liquidity and solvency for high-and low-risk acquirers. We find that high-risk acquirers acquire distressed targets that are on average smaller and less leveraged than targets acquired by low-risk acquirers.
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In addition, we examine several deal-characteristics for both types of acquirers. Table 10b reports summary statistics of these characteristics. High-risk acquirers execute less cross-border deals (27.65%) than low-risk acquirers (40.12%). High-risk acquirers have, on average, higher buyand-hold returns, lower market-to-book ratios and less acquisition experience than low-risk acquirers. Further, most of the deals by low-risk acquirers take place in bull markets (84.20%) whereas deals by high risk acquirers are more or less equally spread between bear and bull markets.
In addition, high-risk acquirers prefer to pay in stock (42.67%) instead of cash (30.67%) in contrast to low-risk acquirers who prefer to pay in cash (71.65%) rather than stock (15.75%).
14 12 The subsamples of low-risk and high-risk acquirers are based on the degree of default risk. However, our findings hold for the subsamples of low-risk and high-risk acquirers based on the degree of historical volatility (including downside risk) apart from high risk acquirers being less leveraged than low risk acquirers. 13 The same findings hold for the subsamples of low-risk and high-risk acquirers based on the degree of historical volatility (including downside risk). 14 The same findings hold for the subsamples of low-risk and high-risk acquirers based on the degree of historical volatility (including downside risk). However, the difference of buy-and-hold returns between both subsamples is significant at 1%.
Insert Table 10b About Here
The above results indicate that the different risk-effects of low-risk and high-risk acquirers are motivated by diverse acquisition decisions. Therefore, we run separate regressions on both subsamples (not reported). We find that the risk effects of high-risk acquirers are determined by the same factors as the regression results on the overall sample. This suggests that high-risk acquirers have the potential to decrease risk by taking over distressed targets through deliberate acquisition decisions. For example, high-risk acquirers are more reluctant to take additional leverage on their balance sheet by preferring stock-financed deals involving less leveraged targets. By contrast, risk effects of low-risk acquirers are mainly driven by relative size of the deal and leverage changes. We test these results further via interaction effects and confirm our main findings. Table 10c shows a strong interaction effect between low-risk acquirers and relative size of the deal. This points to a considerable risk increase for low-risk acquirers involved in large and complex deals. Moreover, we find a strong interaction effect between low-risk acquirers and leverage changes indicating that the default risk of low-risk acquirers mainly increases due to increases in leverage surrounding the transaction. We further explore the source of this leverage effect by comparing post-acquisition leverage to combined pre-acquisition leverage and document a significant increase. This indicates that the increased leverage surrounding the acquisition is not solely caused by target's leverage.
Insert Table 10c About Here
Robustness checks
To verify the robustness of our results, we perform several additional tests. First, we restrict our sample to deals with a minimum relative size of 5% and add time dummies to our multivariate regression. We find that our main results are invariant.
Second, we drop all deals which fall within 250 trading days between separate acquisition announcements to avoid confounding events (which reduces the sample size by half). We did not impose this restriction initially as it would bias our results towards less frequent acquirers. We document that the acquirer market-to-book ratio is no longer significant for the volatility measures, however default risk still significantly increases for acquirers with high market-to-book ratios. In addition, we do not find overpayment in such acquisitions. However, these results may be biased by the small sample size.
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Third, we impose the restriction that distressed targets have an ICR smaller than one in the first, second and third year prior to the acquisition. In addition, we exclude transactions involving bankrupt targets (2%). We confirm our main results. Moreover, we calculate the Altman Z-score of the targets in our distressed sample. We find that 74.68% of the targets have a Z-score smaller than 1.81 indicating that these companies are in the 'distress zone'.
Fourth, to evaluate whether our results are not driven by distressed acquirers, we removed from our distressed sample all acquirers with an interest coverage ratio less than one, one year prior to the deal (which reduces the sample size with about 100 observations). The results confirm our main findings. However, the decrease in acquirer post-acquisition volatility is no longer significant for conglomerate distressed acquisitions. This suggests that especially distressed acquirers benefit from the risk-reducing effect of conglomerate transactions. We test the subsample of distressed acquirers and confirm that the coefficient of CONGLOMERATE is significantly negative indicating that volatility decreases post-acquisition. However, future research may examine the specific drivers of M&A by distressed acquirers.
Finally, we evaluate the impact of distressed acquisitions on bondholder risk by investigating changes in bond spreads surrounding the acquisition announcement, defined as the difference between bond yield and government bond. We are able to compose a sample of 88 bond spreads (29 acquirers) and find that bond spreads significantly increase post-acquisition both absolutely (12 bps) and relatively (10.9%), which is consistent with our previous findings.
16 15 We only have about 90 observations for the regressions including the variable premium. 16 Bond data is downloaded from Thomson Datastream. In order to explain these risk effects further, we examine the influence of diversification, acquirer management quality and expertise, market conditions, bidder overpayment and acquirer pre-acquisition risk. We show that high market-to-book acquirers, frequent acquirers, low-risk acquirers, higher acquisition premia and deals closed during bull markets are associated with higher levels of post-acquisition risk. The risk increase for high market-to-book acquirers is probably driven by a higher availability of resources. Yet, these firms might be vulnerable to management hubris.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
However, overpayment is lower for transactions involving high market-to-book acquirers which is inconsistent with the hubris hypothesis. In addition, downside risk increases for acquirers with high recent stock performance indicating that following a distressed acquisition their sensitivity to downside market movements rises. Not surprisingly, the turnaround and integration process of a distressed target brings more uncertainty in bear markets. Correspondingly, bidders take more risk during (over-)optimistic markets. Further, we find that the risk increase for low-risk acquirers is mainly driven by closing larger distressed deals and taking up higher levels of leverage.
Although some of these results may point to management hubris in distressed acquisitions, it is surprising that default risk for high-risk acquirers even decreases when acquiring a target with a higher degree of default risk. Asset diversification reduces default risk by 54%, whereas the acquisition itself creates a risk increase of only 16%. This could be explained by high-risk acquirers being more reluctant towards additional leverage by preferring stock-financed deals involving less leveraged targets. However, such acquisition decisions are inconsistent with the theory of management hubris. Hence, risk effects in distressed acquisitions cannot exclusively be explained by risk transfer but may be influenced by bidder pre-acquisition levels of performance and risk and market conditions.
From a social point of view, partial risk increases following distressed acquisitions may be justified if the target's alternative is bankruptcy, which often destroy value and lower economic welfare. Therefore, governments should encourage these transactions and consider them rightfully as alternative to bankruptcy or Chapter 11 type of exits.
While our study documents a number of deal-and firm-specific characteristics, managerial biases could further affect risk in distressed acquisitions. Given the separation between ownership and control, future research may well take into account the relation between corporate risk-taking and management entrenchment (Bebchuk et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2003) . Managers that have more freedom in making decisions could influence acquisition choices in significant ways. Moreover, managerial risk-preferences may be associated with incentive systems. Furfine and Rosen (2011) find that managers with large option-based compensation are incentivized to risk-increasing actions in corporate acquisitions. Future investigation of the topic might also extend our analysis by having a detailed look at institutional differences such as the impact of differences in bankruptcy procedures.
Clearly, in this unprecedented and challenging environment a better understanding of distressed acquisitions is needed. 
Control variables

Independent variables
Explanatory variables
Pre-acquirer performance
Diversification
Management quality and expertise
Acquirer pre-acquisition risk 
include a dummy which is equal to 1 if the acquirer and target do not share the same two -digit SIC-code (CONGLOMERATE), a dummy equal to 1 for a cross-border transaction (CROSSBORDER), the acquirer market-adjusted buy-and-hold return for the period from -280 to -30 days (BHR), the acquirer average market-to-book ratio for the period from -280 to -30 days (MTB), acquirer prior experience (ACQEXP), a dummy equal to 1 if the bidder is in the first (last) quartile of the distribution of pre-acquisition volatility (distance-to-default) (LOWRISK), a dummy equal to 1 if the bidder is in the fourth (first) quartile of the distribution of pre-acquisition volatility (distance-to-default) (HIGHRISK), the yearly change in MSCI market return index (BULL_BEAR), the change in the ratio total leverage to total assets post-announcement minus pre-announcement (CHANGESLEV), the target interest coverage ratio one year before the deal (TARGETICR), a dummy that equals one if the target is in a high-tech company (TARGETHIGHTECH), dummy indicating the acquisition is fully paid in stock (ALLSTOCK), the cumulative abnormal returns from -2 to +2 days relative to the announcement date computed from a market model estimated over -280 to -30 days before the announcement (CAR), a dummy which equals 1 if the target is listed (TARGETPUBLIC), the ratio of deal value to the acquirer market value of assets (RELSIZE), log of acquirer market value of assets prior to the announcement (ACQSIZE), the corporate bond spread (C_SPREAD
